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ABSTRACT
The paper deals with the impact of beauty on employability of people, stressing the first stage of the 
hiring process. In particular, we studied if there exists a preference for attractive candidates and if it  
does whether it depends on sex, physical features and racial characteristics.
We monitored all relevant agencies offering jobs in Italy from August 2011 to September 2012 
sending 11008 CVs to 1542 advertised job openings. To do so, we construct fake CVs and we sent 
the  same CV 8 times,  changing  only  name and  surname,  address,  and  the  photo  included.  In 
particular, we sent 4 CVs with photo of an attractive and unattractive man and women, and 4 CVs 
without photo of an Italian and a foreign men and women to each job opening.
Callbacks rates are statistically significant higher for attractive women and men than unattractive 
ones. Racial discrimination appears to be statistically relevant, but less than discrimination based on 
the physical features, especially for women.
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1. Introduction
Aristotele said: “Personal beauty is a greater recommendation than any letter of reference” After 
thousands of years this concept continues to hold.
In nowadays’ society people are often discriminated for their physical attractiveness. Discrimination 
based on the various components of physical appearance results in “premia” for those individuals 
characterized by certain attributes, and in penalties for persons failing to match the given standard.
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Studi di Messina, Via T. Cannizzaro 278, 98122 Messina, Italy
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In  France,  the  country  of  the  Enlightenment  and  human  rights,  people  refer  to  the  aesthetic 
discrimination in terms of “beautism”. This kind of discrimination is so widespread that several 
candidates to work positions use to include into their CVs, not only their skills and titles (such as 
education, languages spoken, experiences, etc), but also a “video resume” in which they present and 
enhances themselves.
“Pole D’Eploi” is a French firm at which it is possible to attend a course called “action looking” to 
learn tricks and how to dress-up in order to encourage recruitment in job interviews. In this way, the 
selection of candidates for a job becomes similar to a casting. 
In Italy this kind of discrimination appears to be particularly relevant. In “casting’s society”, an 
article published in 2011 on “la Repubblica”, one of the main Italian newspapers, Anais Ginori 
describes a survey published by Sofres Institute. The results of the survey show that clothing and 
manner of presentation improve the probability of being employed by 82% for candidates with 
same degree  and experience.  The economic  crisis  has  made recruitment  techniques  even more 
ruthless. First impressions are crucial and, as the author wrote in the same article, this rule also 
applies to the work of back office.
Is  such discrimination  a  novelty  in  Italian  labor  market?  Actually,  Italy  is  a  dualistic  country. 
Dualism is a common issue in Italy and it is based on several explanations1. It is the result of past 
determinants: sociological (differences in social capital, Putnam 1993), economical (differences in 
workforce  coming  out  from  agriculture,  Bagnasco  1977)  and  institutional  (formal  norms  vs 
informal rules, Tabellini 2008). Because of dualism, also the access to the job differs regarding 
regions: job opportunities, which reflect firms’ labor demand,  were  concentrated in the North and 
the Center of the Country and they are definitely much more for man than women (Table 1). 
Table 1 – Italian employment and unemployment rate by macro areas and gender
Employment rate
NOR
D
CENTE
R SOUTH ITALY
Male
73,00
% 69,80% 56,20% 66,50%
Female 
57,00
% 52,30% 31,60% 47,10%
Total
65,30
% 61,00% 43,80% 56,80%
Unemployment rate
NOR
D
CENTE
R SOUTH ITALY
Male 6,60% 8,40% 15,90% 9,90%
Female 8,60% 11,00% 19,30% 11,90%
Total 7,40% 9,50% 17,20% 10,70%
Source: Istat
Therefore, data reported in Table 1 depend on the number of firms and the industrial structure of the 
area which behaved differently in different regions. Different firms behaviors not necessarily persist 
in the present as it was in the past. In particular, we wonder if, also in Italy, the considerations 
underlined by the theory of beautism on the relevance of attractiveness premia in the hiring process 
could  be  more  important  than  explanation  based  on  dualism in  influencing  the  probability  of 
receiving a job offer. 
Furthermore, Italy is a growing immigration country. For this reason it is relevant to investigate 
whether Italian labor market is affected by racial discrimination. As showed, among others, by a 
1  Fratianni (2012).
2
recent  analysis  performed by Italy's  National  Office against  Racial  Discrimination (UNAR), an 
institution which collaborate with United Nations, discrimination based on race has increased by 
61% between 2011 and 2012.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate whether the dualisms, traditionally characterizing 
Italian labor market (e.g. discriminations based on region), are still  the ones mainly influencing 
firms hiring decisions or whether, instead, there are new determinants to investigate on. If this is the 
case, what is, among education, nationality, job characteristics, gender and attractiveness, the most 
relevant variable affecting candidates’ probability to get a jog? 
Since we want to analyse the influence of race and attractiveness in the hiring process, we have to 
face two problems common in literature. Firstly, authors (Biddle and Hamermesh 1998, Mobius and 
Rosenblat 2006, Parrett  2007, Eckel and Ragan 2011, Etcoff,  Stock, Haley,  Vickery and House 
2011) commonly consider small samples of students answering hypothetical questions on hiring 
decisions,  and,  secondly,  it  is  often  impossible  for  researchers  to  control  for  employees' 
qualifications and abilities.
On the contrary, in the analysis that we are going to present, we used an empirical strategy that, to 
our  knowledge,  has  never  been  applied  to  Italian  labor  market.  This  methodology  consists  in 
building up an ad hoc created database sending fake CVs to real job openings solving, in this way, 
both the two problems previously mentioned.  Indeed, we analyzed a huge sample based on 11008 
CVs sent to real job offers posted by actual employers, obtaining 3278 callbacks (approximately 
30% of the CVs sent). 
Moreover, the design of our experiment (as already done for Argentina by Bóo, Rossi, and Urzua 
2013) gives us the complete control and observability over candidates' backgrounds, solving in this 
way the  second problem previously  mentioned.  In  effect,  our  applicants  are  identical  in  every 
respect (including their education, work experience, language and computer skills) for each kind of 
job offer: name, nationality, sex, race and pictures (or lack thereof) are the only informations which 
change in between different CVs sent to the same job offer. Moreover, the applications completely 
fulfill employer requirements regarding education, experience and so on.
This methodology is similar to the one applied by Ruffle and Sthudiner (2010) to explore the effect 
of attractiveness (or lack thereof) on the likelihood of being invited for a job interview in Israel. We 
added a racial component, as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), to explore also the impact of 
racial discrimination. To control either for racial discrimination and for discrimination based on 
beauty, we sent 8 identical resumes to firms, 4 resumes with photo of attractive and unattractive 
men and women,  and 4 resumes without photo (two CVs for Italian people, a woman and a man,  
and two for foreigners, a woman and a man). In this last case, African name and nationality are 
indicated in order to control for racial discrimination.
Our design strategy allows us to examine whether there exists a preference for attractive candidates, 
and whether this preference interacts with the applicant's sex and nationality. In our knowledge it is 
the  first  paper  exploring  simultaneously  beauty,  gender  and  racial  discrimination  in  the  hiring 
process in Italy.
Main results obtained by this paper show that attractive women and men get much more callbacks 
(54% for attractive woman and 47% for attractive man) than unattractive ones, and that unattractive 
women get less callbacks than unattractive men (7% for woman and 26% for man).  Moreover, 
foreign women get less callbacks than the average callback rate, but much more than unattractive 
women (12% for foreign woman and 13% for foreign man). These results continue to hold even 
considering jobs not involving any face-to-face contact and/or highly qualified jobs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the main literature on the 
topic. The experimental design is described in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the main empirical 
results. Section 5 provides the conclusions to the paper. 
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2. Related literature
Several jobs analyzed correlation between beauty and labor market, focalizing, in particular, on the 
relation between beauty and wages. 
Feingold  (1992)  analyzes  the  association  between  physical  beauty,  personality  features,  health, 
cleverness  and  mental  skills.  In  this  respect.  Harper  (2000)  finds  that  the  penalty  for  being 
unattractive is about 15% for men and 11% for women, because beauty is considered to be linked 
with social skills, health and intelligence. 
Etcoff, Haley, Vickery and House (2011) included  make-up as an additional element influencing 
common perception of  individual’s features. In particular, they described the relationship between 
beauty, make-up and perceived reliability. A jury had to assign a score from 1 to 7 to the same face, 
before and after having changed make-up style from natural to professional, to glamorous. Jury 
assigns  a  score  for  beauty,  competence,  pleasantness  and  reliability,  assessing  that  make-up 
produces a significant effect in terms of the level of competence perceived.
Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) provided evidence that the most beautiful workers are considered to 
be more confident, and their self-confidence determine a pay rise.
Biddle and Hamermesh (1994) reached the similar  conclusions  studying data  from the US and 
Canada. Their main findings were as follows: attractiveness plays an important role in deciding 
employees' earnings; the penalty for not being attractive is greater for women than men, and it is 
robust across occupations. 
In a different study on graduates from a prestigious law school (Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998), the 
same authors found that a weakly positive and insignificant relationship between attractiveness and 
earnings for lawyers becomes higher and significant as working years accrue.
More recently  Boo et al. (2012) studied, the impact of beauty premium in the labor market sending 
resumes to real job openings in Buenos Aires. In particular, they sent 6 resumes to each firm: 2 
resumes with photos of attractive men or women, 2 with photos of unattractive men or women and 
2 resumes without photo. They manipulated electronically real photos and made them unattractive 
using Photoshop. While resumes containing photos manipulated in order to appear as unattractive 
received 5% of callbacks, attractive photos received a callback rate of 36%.
The two papers most similar to ours in methodology are Ruffle and Sthudiner (2010) and Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2004). Both the papers studied real job opening posted by actual employers in 
order  to  evaluate  various  kind  of  discriminations  during  the  hiring  process.  While  Ruffle  and 
Sthudiner (2010) studied discrimination based on beauty, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) studied 
racial discrimination. 
Ruffle and Sthudiner sent 5312 resumes answering to 2656 job postings in Israel. They sent to each 
offer 6 different resumes, identical in every respect but the photo. They sent CVs including pictures 
of attractive men, women, unattractive men and women and with no photo included. They could 
study  the  photo  effect  because  in  Israel  is  not  that  common  to  include  photos  into  resumes. 
Attractive men got relevant higher callback rates than men resumes with no photo and double than 
unattractive ones. On the contrary, for Israelian women the two authors found relevant evidence of 
discrimination against attractiveness. Thus, beautiful women including a photo on their resumes 
appear  to  be  punished  for  their  attractiveness  and,  consequently,  to  be  more  often  discard  by 
recruiters.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) sent 2435 fictitious resumes in the area of Boston and Chicago, 
considering all the job offers in the Boston Globe and Chicago Tribute Sunday edition during the 
period between July 2001 and May 2002 in order to study the impact of racial discrimination. They 
sent 2 low profile CVs with African American names and White names and 2 high profile CVs with  
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African American names and White names. Using this method, the two authors found large racial 
differences in callback rates. Applicants with White names needed to send about 10 CVs to get one 
callback, whereas those with African American names had to send around 15 resumes to get one 
callback. This 50 percent gap in callback rates is statistically significant. Based on their estimates, a  
White name yields as many more callbacks as an additional eight years of experience and, since 
applicants’ names are randomly assigned, this gap can only be attributed to name manipulation.
As in the papers previously mentioned, our study is based on real job opening posted by actual 
employers. Moreover, it includes both the aspects considered by Ruffle and Sthudiner (2010) and 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), integrating the discrimination connected to attractiveness with 
the one connected to racial discrimination.
In this respect, our research complements these studies. In effect, they found results on singular 
reasons underlying discrimination occurring at  the earliest  stages of  the hiring process.  On the 
contrary, we produced combined results in order to compare beauty, gender and nationality.  .
3. Experimental design and procedures
Our empirical experiment focuses on the impact of attractiveness in the hiring process. Our study 
analyzed all  job postings displayed in the period between august 2011 and September 2012. In 
particular, we submitted 11008 resumes in response to 1542 employments ads published in the most 
important  Italian  job  search  website,  that  does  not  require  registration  (e.g.  lavoratorio.it, 
Lavoro&Stage,  Miojob,  Lavorare.net,  Page  Personnel,  Trovalavoro,  Kijiji,  Inique  Agenzia, 
Archimede agenzia per il lavoro, Manpower divisione Horeca, Combinazioni s.r.l, Quanta agenzia 
per il lavoro, Humangest, Alma, Orienta agenzia per il lavoro, Varese centro per l’impiego, Adecco, 
Obiettivo  lavoro,  Temporary  agenzia  per  il  lavoro,  Free  work,  Maw,  Euro  Interim,  Mr 
Comunication, Open Job).
We produced resumes based on the European format and structure and we use fictitious names and 
addresses. To avoid matching problems, we modified them in order to fulfill the skills required by 
the firms offering jobs. We sent same resumes with same skills several times to all the companies, 
changing the photo attached or including no photo.
For choosing the pictures to be included in the resumes, we selected photographs from Internet and 
we modified  them in  order  to  make  them unrecognizable.  We then  asked  100 students  at  the 
University of Messina to choose which of the people in the photos they considered to be attractive, 
and unattractive. As almost all of them (92%) agreed on the classification, we are confident that 
subjectivity can be excluded from the choice. We created a Gmail account for each of the candidate 
categories, including this email address on the CV as contact information. 
The same2 resume has been sent to firms 8 times: four resumes with different photos of applicants 
and 4 without photos. In particular, a resume with photo have been sent including each time the 
photo of attractive and unattractive Italian women, and attractive and unattractive Italian man. A 
resume containing no photo of Italian and of African (African origin can be inferred by name and 
nationality) person has been sent to each firm for both gender. In all, 9680 resumes for both male 
and female vacancies were sent to 1210 firms. Applications from female (male) workers only were 
invited by 127 (205) firms, and 508 (820) resumes were sent to them, in this last case each firm 
received only four resumes per vacancy.
2  Actually, following the same procedure adopted by Ruffle and Shtudiner (2010), in order not to let employers 
realize that they were receiving identical resumes with different photos and names, we staggered over a few days the 
dispatch of the CVs to the same firms. For the same reason, we used different names and addresses. Finally, all the  
residential  addresses  belong to the city of Rome in order  not  to  make the scrutinizers  perceive differences in the  
candidates for residential reasons.
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In terms of  distribution  by genders,  we sent  more  resumes of  men (almost  51%) than women 
(almost 49%), because we got more job offers requesting exclusively men than exclusively women.
Moreover, we classified the CVs sent in terms of level of education required by the firm. According 
to it,  our dataset  is  composed by 25% of jobs requiring university degree,  43% requiring high 
school diploma, and 32% of jobs not requiring any qualification.
An other distinction in our dataset is between  functions offered  in job postings. In this respect, 
according to ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupation) definition, executive posts 
accounted for 4.94% of job offers, specialized posts for 8.07%, technical jobs 37.39%, office jobs 
13.59%, commercial posts 20.53%, artisans 7.99%, drivers 1.31% and unskilled work 6.18%.
Dividing work categories into jobs  involving and not involving face-to-face contact and implying 
and not implying physical strength we classified the CVs sent into front and back office, hard and 
soft work jobs. We defined front office and hard work either labors for which firms explicitly ask 
for, or the ones for which by no doubt it can be derived from ISCO classification. Approximately 
59% are back office and 41% are front-office jobs, 16% are hard work jobs and 84% are the ones 
which do not imply physical labor (soft work). 
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of job openings in our dataset. 
We also considered  regional distribution of job offers (see Table 2).  As it  might be reasonably 
expected  Lombardy  (16.86%),  Veneto  (9.92%),  Tuscany  (9.52%)  and  Lazio  (18.02%)  are  the 
regions with most of the job offers, while the other regions are characterized by far fewer vacancies.
4. Results
Table  2  and 3,  already  mentioned in  Section  3,  present  also  the  results  of  the  call  back rates 
classified according to our database. Analyzing callback rates in respect to attractiveness, we can 
show that attractive Italian people have much higher call back rates (50%) than unattractive ones 
(17%) and than Italians with no photo (39%).  Also racial discrimination appears to be relevant. 
Table 1 shows widely lower callback rates for foreigners candidates (13%).  According to gender 
classification, men get 32% of callbacks, while women get 28%. 
Considering together beauty, nationality and gender, we obtained an interesting result in terms of 
differences in callback rates. 
Graf.1 – Distribution of callback  rates by attractiveness and gender
IAW= Italian Attractive Woman, NPIW= Italian Woman (No Photo), IUW= Italian Unattractive Woman, NPFW= Foreign Woman (No Photo), IAM= 
Italian Attractive Man, NPIM= Italian Man (No Photo), IUM= Italian Unattractive Man, NPFM= Foreign Man (No Photo)
Italian attractive women (from now on IAW) and Italian attractive man (from now on IAM) are 
called  back  on  average  respectively  54% and  47% of  the  times.  Gender  is  quite  relevant  for 
unattractive  candidates,  indeed  Italian  unattractive  men  (from  now  on  IUM)  obtain  26%  of 
callbacks,  while  Italian  unattractive  women  (IUW)  obtain  a  widely  lower  callback  rate  (7%). 
Attractiveness appears to be then widely relevant in the hiring process especially for women and, in 
particular, for unattractive ones (Graf. 1).
In  respect  to  racial  discrimination,  foreign people  are  relevantly lower called  back than  Italian 
candidates, without relevant discrimination based on gender. Foreign women and men (from now 
on NPFW and NPFM) are actually called back with almost the same percentage. (12% for NPFW, 
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and 13% for NPFM), but widely lower than the callback rate obtained by the correspondent Italians 
resumes with no photo (37% for women and 41% for men).
According to the qualification required, we obtained the highest callback rates for jobs which do not 
require any qualification (38%), while jobs for graduate candidates obtain 28% and jobs for which it 
is required high school diplomas obtain 23% (Table 1).
In terms of  ISCO classification of jobs, we have 43% for unskilled occupations, 41% for service 
workers,  35% for  workmen artisan and drivers,  and 32%  for  executives  and for clerical  jobs. 
Definitely lower callback rates characterize technical (27%) and specialized job (26%), and sales 
workers (16%).
Regarding the categories hard and “soft” works and front and back office, we obtained 42% of 
callback rates for jobs implying hard work, 27% for the ones not implying hard works, 31% for the 
ones implying back office work and 28% for the ones implying front office works.
Table 2 – Summary Statistics
   
CVs 
sent
Call back 
rate
Candidate 
characteristics 
Picture Attractive Italian 25% 50%
Italian with no photo 25% 39%
Unattractive Italian 25% 17%
Foreigner with no photo 25% 13%
Gender Men 51% 32%
Women 49% 28%
Job characteristics Public / 
Office
Front office 41% 28%
Back office 59% 31%
Strength Hard work 16% 42%
Soft work 84% 27%
Qualification 
required
No qualification 32% 38%
High school 43% 28%
Graduated 25% 23%
Function 
offered
Executives 5% 32%
Specialized labor 8% 26%
Technical jobs 37% 27%
Clerical jobs 14% 32%
Sales workers 15% 16%
Service workers 5% 41%
Workmen, artisans and 
drivers
9% 35%
Unskilled workers 6% 43%
As displayed in Table 3, the jobs offered (i.e. the number of CVs sent to each region) differ among 
regions according to the performance of the labor market in the area (as showed in Table 1). We 
also expect some differences in call back rate, since in the South vacancies are fewer than in the 
Center and in the North. For this reason, competition among applicants should be higher and thus 
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we may  expect  lower  callback  rate.  On  the  contrary,  differences  in  call  back  rates  exist,  but 
companies placed in  Umbria,  Abruzzo, Trentino Alto Adige,  Sicily,  Campania and Calabria are 
characterized by higher callback rates  (respectively  39%, 36%, 35%, 34%, and 34%). Definitely 
lower call back rates characterize, instead, regions like Molise, Valle D’Aosta, Lombardy, Marche, 
Piedmont, and Tuscany (respectively 23% the first one, 25% the second and the third, 27% the 
forth, the sixth and the seventh).
Table 3 – Distribution of CVs sent and callback rates by regions of the offering firm
Regions CVs 
sent Call back rate
Piedmont 7% 27%
Valle D'Aosta 2% 25%
Lombardy 17% 25%
Trentino Alto Adige 3% 35%
Veneto 10% 31%
Friuli Venezia Giulia 2% 30%
Liguria 2% 32%
Emilia Romagna 4% 33%
Tuscany 10% 27%
Umbria 2% 2%
Marche 2% 27%
Lazio 18% 30%
Abruzzo 1% 36%
Molise 1% 23%
Campania 4% 34%
Puglia 3% 30%
Basilicata 1% 31%
Calabria 6% 34%
Sicily 5% 35%
Sardinia 1% 28%
Total 100% 30%
Our objective is to investigate whether regional differences, traditionally characterizing Italian labor 
market are still the ones mainly influencing hiring decisions, or whether, instead, there are new 
determinants  to  investigate  and,  if  this  is  the  case,  which  are  the  most  relevant.  In  order  to  
investigate  this  issue,  we performed an analysis  of  the variance classifying possible  reasons of 
discriminations into the ones associated to Gender, Nationality, Attractiveness, Jobs Classification 
and/or Characteristics, Regions. 
These variables, from Table 2 and 3, seems to determine differences in terms of job offers rates and 
of call back rates. Secondly, we test some classification created by the “interaction” among these 
single variables. The intuition is that the best classification to be chosen is the one which display the 
highest variance between groups and the lowest within them.
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Table 4 shows the results  of the total  variance analysis  referred to the 11008 CVs sent and its  
decomposition into particular subsamples. Analyzing all the single categories  results on variance 
decomposition, we note that the variance between groups is very low for regional (1% of total 
variability) and ISCO job classification (1%). Also education (variance between amount to 2%) and 
ISCO classification of jobs does not appear to be a good classifier. Good  classifications can be 
obtained only if we consider attractiveness and its interactions with gender and nationality.
Table 4 - Variance Analysis
Categories Between Total Percentage F Significance
Attractiveness only for 
Italian 159,97 1890,74 8% 381,4 0
Attractiv. only for Ital. 
men 33,05 1000,58 3% 72,46 0
Attractiv. only for Ital. 
women 150,41 884,57 17% 410,58 0
Attractiveness and 
Nationality 268,59 2301,87 6% 484,55 0
Gender 4,29 2301,87 0% 20,53 0
Gender only for Italian 5,60 1890,74 0% 24,511 0
Gender only for 
foreigner 0,02 302,5  0% 0,016 0,9 
Gender only for 
attractive Italian 3,88 687,96 1% 15,6 0
Gender only for  
unattractive Italian 23,8 386,43 6% 180,49 0
Nationality 108,63 2301,87 5% 545,1 0
Attractiveness, 
gender and 
nationality 297,69 2301,87 13% 233,41 0
Attractiveness and 
gender only for 
Italians 189,06 1890,74 10% 183,32 0
ISCO classification of 
jobs 33,94 2301,87 1% 23,51 0
Education 38,33 2301,87 2% 93,18 0
Region of the firm 13,37 2301,87 1% 3,38 0
Jobs implying face to 
face contact 3,2 2301,87 0% 15,31 0
Hard work jobs 32,32 2301,87 1% 156,74 0
Gender  seems  to  be  a  bad  classificatory  variable  (between  variance  amount  to  0%).  Only  for 
unattractive people this classification seem to work (between variance 17%). Attractiveness appears 
to be relevant by itself (between 8%), even if it does not increase its relevance when considering its 
interaction  with  gender.  Even  nationality  appears  to  be  relevant  considered  by  itself  (between 
variance 5%), while its interaction with gender doesn’t seem to have any effect. We obtain the best 
classification when we interact3 gender, nationality and attractiveness (variance between 13%). 
3  Interaction with gender, attractiveness and nationality with other variables do not have significant results.  
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Furthermore,  other  interesting  results  come  out  when  we  apply  ANOVA on  subsamples.  In 
particular, the impact of attractiveness seems to be gender bias, while no gender bias emerges for 
foreign people. In any case, the results coming out from the analysis show new tendencies in hiring 
process discrimination, which take into account determinants connected more to attractiveness than 
any other kind of difference between candidates.
More information can be extracted if we apply the most relevant classification defined by ANOVA 
on the distribution of the CVs receiving respectively positive and no answers. When we compare 
the conditioned distributions with the theoretical one coming out from our experimental design, we 
immediately see that this distribution is not independent from call back rates distribution. We test 
null hypothesis of independence between classification and call backs in Table 5 and, rejecting the 
null, we have an additional check to confirm the result of ANOVA.
Table 5 – Test of independence
H0 = independence (marginal means = conditioned mean)
H1 = dependence (marginal mean ≠ conditioned mean)
X2 di Pearson = 1432,62; Df = 7; P-value = 0
The discrepancies are significant; H0 = refuses
As  shown  in  Table  6  conditioned  distributions  are  different  from  marginal  one,  except  for 
unattractive men. Moreover, it is interesting to note that attractiveness appears to be much more 
polarized for women than for men and that, in particular, the beauty penalization for unattractive 
women is higher than the beauty premium for attractive ones.
Table 6 - Discrimination tests
Frequencie
s for 
positive 
answers 
(N=3278)
Frequencies for no answers (N=7730)
Categories marginal 
distrib.
Freq. Stand. dev. Z values for 
pos. answers
Freq. Stand. dev. Z values for 
no answers
Italian 
attractive 
women
0,12 0,22 0,4151 13,9544 0,08 0,2700 -13,2936
Italian 
women (No 
photo) 
0,12 0,15 0,3578 4,9126 0,11 0,3117 -3,0868
Italian 
unattractive 
women
0,12 0,03 0,1703 -30,2875 0,16 0,3669 9,6536
Foreign 
women (No 
photo)
0,12 0,05 0,2199 -17,9775 0,15 0,3584 7,6922
Italian 
attractive 
0,13 0,20 0,4013 10,2222 0,10 0,2967 -9,6177
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men
Italian men 
(no photo) 
0,13 0,18 0,3835 7,3267 0,11 0,3093 -6,5056
Italian 
unattractive 
men
0,13 0,11 0,3154 -3,2754 0,14 0,3424 1,4319
Foreign 
men (no 
photo)
0,13 0,05 0,2272 -18,9952 0,16 0,3665 7,1713
5. Conclusion
From  the  performed  analysis  we  observed  the  existence  of  a  significant  social  problem  of 
discrimination in hiring process in Italy. Unlike what one could expect, discrimination in callback 
rates is neither based on regional differences, nor on lower employability of women, but on other 
aspects. In other word, the dualism in the labor market seems not to affect an applicant’s probability 
to receive a  positive callback from a firm4.  The new tendencies of employability  are based on 
attractiveness much more than traditional regional differences, or the ones based on education and 
job characteristics. Moreover, in Italy we  measured a relevant discrimination based on Nationality. 
Gender’s  impact  on  discrimination  become trickier  than  the  one  which  traditionally  concerned 
Italian labor market. In effect, gender seems to have little discriminatory effect considered by itself, 
but it takes relevance when it is interacted with attractiveness, especially for women. 
To summarize our main results, we could say that if you want a job in Italy and you are not Italian, 
it will be difficult to find it, but it is always better to be foreigner than to be an unattractive Italian 
woman. Thus, searching for a job seems to be just like a beauty contest: it is better for unattractive 
women to invest on aesthetic surgery than in education.
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